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Abstract
We use a simple New Keynesian model, with firm specific capital, non-zero steady-state
inflation, long-run risks and Epstein-Zin preferences to study the volatility implications
of a monetary policy shock. An unexpected increase in the policy rate by 150 basis
points causes output and inflation volatility to rise around 10% above their steady-state
standard deviations. VAR based empirical results support the model implications that
contractionary shocks increase volatility. The volatility effects of the shock are driven by
agents’ concern about the (in) ability of the monetary authority to reverse deviations from
the policy rule and the results are re-enforced by the presence of non-zero trend inflation.
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Monetary authorities around the industrialised world are responsible for country’s price, growth,
employment and financial stability. They aim to meet the objectives set by the society via
their instruments. This suggests that their actions have a first order effect on agents’ economic
behaviour. For instance, monetary authorities are able to alter households’ and firms’ consump-
tion, investment and pricing plans by adjusting the policy rate. The transmission of monetary
policy actions to the economy and their first order effects are well studied by the monetary
economics literature. However, the volatility implications – second order effects – induced by
these actions have received less attention.
The question that arises naturally is “do we need to be concerned about the volatility effects of
monetary policy shocks?”. A number of recent events suggest that the answer to this question
is yes. For example, the “taper tantrum” in June 2013 was associated with an increase in
speculation that the Federal Reserve would start on a tapered end to QE in 2014. This discus-
sion increased financial market volatility, pushed up long-term interest rates and induced heavy
losses on bond investors. These anecdotal observations are further supported by empirical re-
sults present below. Using a structural VAR with stochastic volatility (extended to allow for
feedback from the endogenous variables to the volatility), we show that monetary policy shocks
increase macroeconomic volatility and the results are robust across identification schemes.
To understand how volatility is affected when monetary authorities decide to deviate unex-
pectedly from their Taylor type reaction function, we employ a stylised New Keynesian DSGE
model, with firm specific capital, non-zero steady-state inflation, long-run risks and Epstein-Zin
preferences. The model has been calibrated to match successfully a set of macroeconomic and
financial moments.
Simulations from the theoretical model suggest that the transmission of the policy shock to
volatility depends on three model parameters: the interest rate policy smoothing, the Eptein-
Zin risk and the steady-state inflation parameters. The policy rate smoothing parameter is
what causes the monetary policy to have economically significant volatility effects and not the
shock per se. In other words, the agents are not that much concerned that authorities are
able to deviate unexpectedly form their objective function but they price significantly the fact
that they cannot fully undo such actions. When the economy is at its steady-state, then an
expected increase increase of the policy rate is interpreted as a ‘mistake’ as it represents a
deviation from the Taylor rule and causes inflation and output growth to deviate form target
values. Authorities try from the second period onwards to correct their mistake by cutting
the policy rate but they can only do so partly due to their smoothing preferences. Consistent
with the analysis of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and Swanson (2015), the Epstein-Zin
risk parameter alters the size of these second order effects. Finally, the non-zero steady-state
inflation parameter induces a trade off between nominal and real volatility. As the steady-
state inflation increases the slope of the Phillips curve becomes flatter (see for instance, Ascari
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and Sbordone (2014) and King and Wolman (1999)) and this reflects firms’ elevated concerns
about expected inflation that erodes their average markup. As the demand decreases after a
contractionary monetary policy shock, firms find it optimal to reduce their prices. However,
they also realise that inflation trends and, due to Calvo pricing contracts, they may become
stuck with the current price for some time. At the same time because the Phillips curve is
flatter the monetary authorities become less effective in restoring inflation back to its target
and this causes the long-term interest rate to be lower for longer, which ends up stimulating
output a year after the shock. This elevated demand is what mitigates households’s concerns
about output.
The analysis presented here goes some way in explaining why authorities have been extremely
cautious about when to initiate monetary policy normalisation as they may not be able to
undo their actions quickly. The role played by steady state inflation in the model indicates
that calls to raise the inflation target (see Blanchard et al. (2010)) as a counter to the zero
lower bound (ZLB) may be misplaced. As in Coibion et al. (2012) and Ascari et al. (2015) our
study highlights the nominal risks of raising the inflation target in an environment where firms
set price based on Calvo schemes and monetary authorities set policy based on a Taylor rule
reaction function.
As in empirical and theoretical literature on the impact of uncertainty shocks (Bloom (2009),
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2011), Mumtaz and Zanetti (2013), Born and Pfeifer (2014), Mum-
taz and Theodoridis (2015) and Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (forthcoming)), our paper highlights
the importance of these type of disturbances. However, the focus and results of our analysis
are novel in one key respect. Unlike the bulk of the uncertainty literature, this paper attempts
to model the transmission of monetary policy shocks to economic volatility and thus takes a
step towards treating economic volatility as endogenous.
The papers closest to our work are the studies of Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and Swanson
(2015), who use a very similar theoretical setup to the one employed here to understand the
asset pricing implications of volatility effects caused by level shocks. Our paper is also related
to the work of Bikbov and Chernov (2013), Song (2014) and Campbell et al. (2014), who uses
macro-finance models to understand the relationships between monetary policy and bond risk
premia. Finally, our study is related to the literature that investigates the macroeconomic
implications of non-zero steady-state inflation (Cogley and Sbordone (2008), Ascari and Rossi
(2012) and Ascari and Sbordone (2014)).
The paper is organised as follows, Section 2 presents the empirical model and discusses the data
and empirical results. Section 3 reviews the theoretical model, its calibration and presents the
impulse response analysis. The final section concludes.
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2 Empirical Analysis
In this section we present results from a simple econometric model that show strong evidence
that contractionary monetary policy shocks result in an increase in macroeconomic volatility.
2.1 Empirical Model
In order to estimate the impact of monetary policy shocks on second moments of key macroe-












In equation (1) Zt denotes the N = 4 macroeconomic variables described below. The matrix
Ht holds the volatility of the orthogonalised shocks on the main diagonal
Ht = diag([exp (h1,t) , exp (h2,t) , .., exp (hN,t)])
The structure of the A matrix is chosen by the econometrician to model the contemporaneous
relationship amongst the reduced-form shocks. We discuss our choice of the structure of the A
matrix in section 2.4 below.
The transition equation for the stochastic volatilities is given by the following VAR model:
h˜t = α + θh˜t−1 +
K∑
j=1
djZt−j + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0, Q), E (et, ηt) = 0 (3)
h˜t denotes a matrix that holds the log variances h1,t, h2,t, ..hN,t. The VAR constants and coeffi-
cients on lags are denoted by α and θ, respectively. The coefficients dj allow lagged endogenous
variables to affect the log variances. If these coefficients are non-zero, then shocks to equation
(1) have an impact on h˜t and consequently on Ωt and measures of the unconditional variance
of Zt.
The model in Equations (1) and (3) contains two innovations relative to the standard BVAR
with stochastic volatility (see Clark (2011)). First, it allows the elements of h˜t to co-move while
most of the previous literature assumes an independent AR or random walk process for each
log variance. The specification used here thus captures the possibility that volatility of shocks
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to macroeconomic and financial variables may move together – a phenomenon that may be
important during periods of recession and financial stress.
Secondly, unlike previous applications of this model, the addition of the term
∑K
j=1 djZt−j in
equation (3) allows us to investigate the impact of structural shocks on the volatility of the
endogenous variables.1 The model thus accounts for the possibility that the variance of output,
inflation and financial variables may be affected by innovations that have an impact of the level
of these variables. As discussed above, our interest lies in investigating the possible impact of
monetary policy shocks on the second moments of the endogenous variables. The specification
above enables us to calculate the impulse response of var (Zt) to a monetary policy shock
identified via an appropriate structure for A.
The benchmark model makes the simplifying assumption that h˜t does not have a feedback
effect on the endogenous variables (see Mumtaz and Theodoridis (2015), Mumtaz and Surico
(2013) and Mumtaz and Zanetti (2013) for example). This assumption reduces the number
of unobserved state variables in the model and simplifies the estimation algorithm. We show
in the sensitivity analysis that an extended model that allows for this feedback produces very
similar impulse responses and this assumption appears innocuous in our application.
2.2 Data
The model is estimated using US data on the monthly growth rate of industrial production,
monthly CPI inflation, the three month T-bill rate and the spread of 10 year government bonds
over the three month T-bill rate. The data is monthly and runs from 1947m1 to 2007m12, with
the last few years dropped as they represent the period of unconventional monetary policy. The
data on industrial production, CPI and the three month T-Bill rate is obtained from FRED,
while the long term bond yield is obtained from Global Financial Data.
2.3 Estimation and impulse responses
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods. In the on-line appendix we state in detail
the Gibbs sampling algorithm used to approximate the posterior distribution. In short, the
algorithm is a simple extension of the MCMC methods used to estimate Bayesian VARs with
stochastic volatility, presented for example in Cogley and Sargent (2005a). The prior distri-
bution for the VAR coefficients in equation (1) are based on existing studies and ‘shrink’ the
VAR coefficient matrix towards an AR specification for each endogenous variable. We employ
a similar prior for the transition equation and thus assume apriori that each log stochastic
volatility follows an AR process and that there is no feedback from Zt−j.
1An exception is the univariate stochastic volatility in mean model of Chan (0) that allows lagged effects
from the data in the transition equation.
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The impulse responses of log var (Zt) to a monetary policy shock are calculated via Monte-
Carlo integration.2 In particular, the impulse responses are defined as the difference between
the following conditional expectations
IRFt = E (ln var (Zt+k) \Ψt, Zt−1, µ)− E (ln var (Zt+k) \Ψt, Zt−1) (4)
where Ψt denotes the parameters and state variables of the model and µ is the monetary policy
shock. The first term in equation (4) denotes a forecast of the log volatility conditioned on
one of the structural shocks µ. Note that, the volatility of the endogenous variables depends
on the structural shocks through equation (3) above. The second term is the baseline forecast
of the log variance, i.e. conditioned on the scenario where the shock equals zero. Koop et al.
(1996) describe how to approximate these conditional expectations via a stochastic simulation
of the non-linear VAR model. We use 100 simulations to calculate IRFt repeating this for 500
retained Gibbs draws. In order to account for history dependence of the non-linear responses,
the calculation is done for t = 1, 12, ...T i.e. every 12th month in the sample and the mean
across time is reported in the figures below.
2.4 Model specification and identification
We set the lag length in the VAR model to 12 and use 3 lags of the endogenous variables in the
transition equation (3). As shown in the sensitivity analysis, the main results are very similar
for longer lag lengths.
We consider three schemes to identify the monetary policy shock. The benchmark identification
scheme uses contemporaneous sign restrictions to identify the monetary policy shock. We
assume that a contractionary policy shock increases the short-term interest rate on impact
and leads to a fall in industrial production growth and CPI inflation. The second scheme
assumes a recursive structure and implies that monetary policy shocks have no contemporaneous
impact on output and inflation but can affect the term spread immediately. Finally, we use the
cumulated Romer and Romer (2004) index as a proxy for monetary policy shocks and include
it in the VAR model in place of the short-term interest rate and estimate the responses using
the same recursive structure as in the previous scheme.
2.5 Results
Figure 1 presents the impulse response to a contractionary monetary policy shock normalised to
increase the T-Bill rate by 100 basis points. The monthly growth rate of industrial production
declines by 0.5% on impact an recovers within 2 months. The term spread decline by about
70 basis points on impact suggesting that the long term rate rises by about 30 basis points












































































































in response to monetary contraction. The response of inflation is characterised by the price
puzzle with inflation rising beyond the impact period before returning to base in about two
years. This positive response of inflation is common across all the identification schemes we
employ and is consistent with the view expressed in recent papers that this is a feature of the
data in the pre-Volcker period (see Castelnuovo and Surico (2010)).
The last three rows of the figure present the response of the unconditional volatility to this
shock. It is clear from the figure that the volatility of all endogenous variables rises in response
to this shock. This is reflected in the measure of overall volatility, the log determinant of the
covariance matrix of the endogenous variables which shows a persistent increase.3 The response
of volatility is persistent lasting for about 2.5 to 3 years with the magnitude of the response of
the interest rates somewhat larger than the macroeconomic variables.
Figure 2 presents the response of the volatility of the endogenous variables estimated using
the three identification schemes discussed above. The figure shows the two alternative identi-
fication schemes also suggest that the log volatility of all variables increases after a monetary
contraction. The on-line appendix shows that the same results are obtained if the specification
of the model is changed. For example, the same results are obtained from an extended model
that allows feedback from the stochastic volatilities to the endogenous variables. Finally, the
results remain the same if industrial production is replaced by the unemployment rate or if a
stock market index is introduced into the model.
To summarise, the empirical analysis suggests that contractionary monetary policy shocks result
in an increase in the variance of output, inflation and financial variables such as interest rates
and the term spread. In the next section we build a DSGE model to explain the transmission
of the monetary policy shock into second moments of these variables.
3 Theoretical Analysis
3.1 DSGE Model
The model used in this section is very similar to the one developed by Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012). In this section we describe the building blocks of the key sectors of the model.
Households: The economy is populated by a continuum of households (h ∈ [0, 1]) that attain




































































where σL is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity, σC stands for the inverse of intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and Z˜t denotes the non-stationary productivity process (the tilde






where z is the steady-state value of the productivity growth, ρz indicates the degree of persis-
tence and σz is the standard deviation of the productivity process. Furthermore, households
have recursive preferences (Epstein and Zin (1989), Weil (1989, 1990))
Vt (h) = u
(






The attractive feature of Epstein-Zin preferences is that the coefficient of relative risk aversion
decouples from the intertemporal elasticity parameter. The parameter γ illustrates the degree
of agents’ desire for an early resolution of uncertainty over future consumption. Household




+ Tt (h) = P˜tW˜tLt (h) + D˜t−1 (h) + Ξt (h) (8)
where P˜t is the price index, D˜t (h) is the one period risk free government debt, Rt is the return
on investing on the government debt, W˜t stands for the real wage, Tt (h) is the lump sum taxes








t = W˜t (9)















1−γ V −γt+1 (10)




















Firms: There is a continuum of intermediary good producers (f ∈ [0, 1]) that combine labour
and capital, which is fixed over time, using the following production function
Y˜t (f) = Z˜t (Lt (f))
1−φKφ (13)
where φ is the capital share in the production function. Furthermore, capital is assumed to be
firm specific (Woodford (2003), Altig et al. (2011), Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)) and this
implies that marginal cost is different across firms
MCt (f) =
W˜tLt (f)
(1− φ) Y˜t (f)
(14)
Firms sets price in a staggered manner, every period the firm with a probability 1− ξ receives



















If the firm misses this signal then it is not permitted to reset its price (Calvo (1983)).











where ε denotes the elasticity of substitution between the differentiated goods produced in each










ε − ∫ 1
0









The maximisation problem (15) is subject to the constraint (17) and it descirbes firms’ optimal
pricing decisions:
K˜p,t (f) = MCt (f) Y˜t (f) + βξEtMt+1Π
ε
t+1K˜P,t+1 (f) (18)
F˜p,t (f) = Y˜t (f) + βξEtMt+1Π
ε−1








Government: The government in this economy runs a balance budget




where Gt is government consumption and gt is the of the government share in the economy
G˜t = gtY˜t (22)
that evolves in a stochastic manner
gˆt = g + ρg (gˆt−1 − g) + σgωg,t (23)
Monetary policy is set based on Taylor Type rule













where Π is the inflation target, ρR is the interest rate smoothing parameter, ζΠ and ζY d are
the policy reaction coefficients to inflation and demand growth, respectively.




Lt (f) df (25)
and it is equal to the quantity supplied by household due the flexibility of wages. Using the













]1−φ = Z˜tL1−φt Kφ∆t (26)














Finally, using the expression about the aggregate profits:
Ξt = P˜tY˜t −
∫ 1
0
P˜t (h) Y˜t (h) +
∫ 1
0




Ξt = P˜tY˜t − P˜tW˜tLt (28)
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= C˜t + G˜t (29)
The de-trended and steady-state calculations are discussed on the Appendix C.
3.2 Calibration
The model is calibrated using simulated methods of moments techniques (Canova (2005), Ruge-
Murcia (2012)).4 However, the value of a small number of parameters is decided prior to the
minimisation. To be precise, the share of capital in the production (φ) has been calibrated
to 0.36, a number typically used in the literature (Christiano et al. (2005), Trabandt and
Uhlig (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012)). Similar to Smets and Wouters (2007) and
Christiano et al. (2005) the steady-state value of domestic producers’ markup is 20% ( = 6).
The calibration of the Taylor rule is quite standard, the inflation and output reaction parameters
are set to 1.50 and 0.125, respectively. The steady state value of output and hours have been
set equal to 1 and 1/3, respectively. Finally, the standard deviations of all shocks have been
set equal to 0.005.
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameters Description Values
φ Capital Production Share 0.360
 Intermediate Goods Elasticity of Substitution 6.000
ζΠ Policy Response to Inflation 1.500
ζY d Policy Response to Demand Growth 0.125
σR Standard Deviation of Policy Shock 0.005
σz Standard Deviation of Productivity Shock 0.005
σg Standard Deviation of Government Share Shock 0.005
The parameters β, Π, Z, σC , σL, γ, ξ, ρR, ρz and ρg are selected to match, the average values of
inflation, policy rate, term-premium, the standard deviations of output, inflation, term-spread,
term-premium, the first order autocorrelations of output, inflation, the correlation between the
term-spread and output and, finally, the correlation between the term-spread and inflation.
The model is solved using third-order perturbation methods. To avoid explosive solutions we
follow Kim et al. (2008) and Andreasen et al. (2013) and we ‘prune’ all those terms that have
an order that is higher than the approximation order.5
4Although Andreasen et al. (2013) derive closed form expressions for the moments of a third approximated
DSGE model, these formulations rely on Kronecker products and due to Matlab computation memory require-
ments can only be applied to a small scale DSGE models. This implies that the DSGE implied moments can
be produced only via simulation.
5All the calculations have implemented using Dynare 4.4.3. The model and replication files can be down-
loaded from authors’ webpages.
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Table 2: Parameters Selected Using SMM
Parameters Description Values
β Time Discount Factor 0.9999
Π Inflation Target 1.0082
Z Steady State Value of Productivity Growth 1.0041
σC Inverse of Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution 1.7960
σL Inverse of Frisch Elasticity 4.0000
γ Epstein-Zin Preference Risk -4.0000
ξ Calvo Probability 0.8818
ρR Interest Rate Smoothing 0.5985
ρz Persistence of Productivity Growth Process 0.6754
ρg Persistence of Government Share Process 0.9316
The values of β, Π and Z imply that the non-stochastic steady-state of annual inflation is
3.26%, output growth 1.65% and the policy rate 6.25%. Firms reset prices every two years,
finally we use the expressions developed by Swanson (2012) to calculate that the coefficient of
relative risk aversion is 3.03.
Table 3: Moments Comparison
Moments Variables Data Model
Policy Rate 1.39 1.38
Mean Inflation 0.79 0.68
Term Premia 0.52 0.65
Output 1.45 1.41
Inflation 0.54 0.58
Standard Deviation Policy Rate 0.99 0.90
Slope 0.40 0.69
Term Premia 0.27 0.21
Output 0.88 0.92
Inflation 0.90 0.79
1st Order Autocorrelation Policy Rate 0.97 0.81
Slope 0.88 0.72
Term Premia 0.95 0.97
Correlation Output, Slope -0.48 -0.20
Output, Inflation -0.52 -0.51
Notes: The DSGE implied moments have been produced using 2000 simulated data points.
Table 3 compares the moments implied by the model (not only those used in the estimation)
against their data counterparts. Even though the model is extremely stylised and there are




The novel part of our analysis is that we focus on the volatility implications of the monetary
policy shock. With the term volatility we refer to the conditional heteroscedastic response of a







where σx is the unconditional (steady-state) standard deviation of the variable xt. As it is
explained in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and Swanson (2015), the higher moments of
economy’s endogenous state vector are time-varying (σx,t) due to the Epstein-Zin preferences
and the additive separability of consumption in the period utility function. According to these
authors the additive separability property of consumption makes the model non-homogeneous
and this is what induces a small degree of conditional heteroscedasticity, which is further
enhanced by the risk aversion parameter (γ).
The economic intuition behind these two technical conditions is as follows. The specific life
time utility functional form breaks the link between the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
parameter and the coefficient of relative risk aversion (induced by ‘standard’ preferences) and
agents in these economies prefer an early resolution of uncertainty over future consumption.6 As
explained in Colacito and Croce (2013) this creates an endogenous trade-off between expected
utility and variance utility, meaning that agents are happy to give away some expected future
consumption in order to mitigate the risks of future expected consumption (precautionary
motives). This feature combined with the additive separability of consumption makes agents’
responses to depend on the current level of consumption/output (state of the economy). This
implies that when the current level of the marginal utility of consumption is high (or level of
consumption/output is low) then consumption uncertainty is higher (relative to the case where
the intial level of consumption/output is high) and this reflects agents’ elevated concerns about
future shocks. This is because an adverse shock that lowers output further is going to induce
a proportionally larger reduction in consumption relative to the case where the initial level of
counsumpton/output was high (Rudebusch and Swanson (2012)).
3.4 Impulse Response Analysis
Figure 3 illustrates what happens to the economy after a monetary policy shock. We plot
the generalised impulse responses (Koop et al. (1996)) of the non-linear model (red solid line)
against the responses of the linearly approximated model (blue dashed line). Since both sets
of responses are fairly similar, we can conclude safely that the results are driven mostly by
the first order dynamics and the additional polynomial solution terms allows us to view the
6This is true when the degree of risk aversion exceeds the intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter,


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































uncertainty implications of the monetary policy shock. This is an interesting outcome as it
suggests that most our analysis applies to a large class of models.
This is also supported by Figure 4, where in this exercise the blue dashed illustrates the model
variable nonlinear responses to a monetary policy shocks when the Epstein-Zin risk parameter
(γ) is set equal to the inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution parameter (σC). This
cancels the nonlinearities induced by the recursive preferences (trade-off between expected
utility and variance utility) and reduces the coefficient of relative risk aversion to zero. Relative
to the benchmark calibration (red solid line) the uncertainty effects are mitigated, which is
entirely consistent with the analysis in Rudebusch and Swanson (2012), Swanson (2015) and the
discussion in Section 3.3. To be precise, Rudebusch and Swanson (2012) and, more explicitly,
Swanson (2015) argue that it is the functional form of the period utility function (additively
separable consumption) that generates a small degree of conditional heteroscedasticity, which
is boosted further by the risk aversion parameter (γ). When γ is set equal to σC this additional
enhancement does not take place and the the volatility effects of a monetary policy shock are
expected to be smaller.
The difference between the responses with Epstein-Zin and expected preferences (red solid and
blue dashed line respectively, Figure 4) is not significant in economic terms and somebody
could object the usefulness of the recursive preference specification adopted here. Although,
this statement is correct, it is conditional on the (very) small value of the coefficient of relative
risk aversion required for the model to be able to match the moments in the data (Table 3).
Our estimate falls definitely to the lower end of the values used/estimated in the literature
(Piazzesi and Schneider (2007) van Binsbergen et al. (2012), Andreasen (2012), Rudebusch and
Swanson (2012) and Swanson (2015)), suggesting that the volatility increase after a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock could be even more dramatic if a number closer to the literature
has had been selected.
It is perhaps not difficult to understand why output volatility increases after an adverse mon-
etary policy shock. As the policy rate rises agents find it optimal to substitute current with
expected consumption. Lower current consumption induces households to supply more labour,
pushing down wages, marginal cost and, consequently, inflation. Although both demand and
inflation contract, authorities loosen policy only by a little due to their smoothing preferences.
Agents are risk averse and policymakers’ actions to restore equilibrium only gradually triggers
their concerns about their future consumption levels as their labour income decreases dramat-
ically. Figure 5 illustrates what happens when authorities’ objective function is not subject to
interest rate smoothing (blue dashed line). Relative to the benchmark calibration of the model
(red solid line), it can be seen that authorities are able to restore the steady-state on the second
period and this reduces the volatility in the economy dramatically.
It is perhaps less obvious why inflation volatility rises after an unexpected policy rate increase.
If inflation is viewed as a social cost and a positive monetary policy shock suppresses the rate
at which prices rise, then agents should be less concerned about inflation in those episodes.
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Although this statement is likely to be correct in most cases, it ignores the pricing behavior
of the firms and, particularly, in those circumstances when steady-state inflation is non-zero.
As demand contracts, firms who receive the random signal are able to reoptimise profits by
setting a lower price. However, while they do that they are aware of the following: (i) that
inflation has a trend and (ii) the possibility that they may remain with this price for some time.
The combination of these two features will cause severe loses to firms and these concerns are
reflected by the elevated inflation volatility generated after a contractionary monetary policy
shock.
Figure 6 investigates further the link between the non-zero steady-state inflation and the
macroeconomic volatility. The blue dashed line on this experiment illustrates what happens
to agents’ responses after an unexpected tightening on the monetary policy when the trend
inflation is switched off; they are plotted against the benchmark impulse responses (red solid
line). The results are intriguing, when the steady-state inflation is set to zero then real (output)
volatility increases dramatically (by more than 30% above its steady-state standard deviation),
while the standard deviation of inflation decreases (by more than 10% below its its steady-state
standard deviation). As explained by Ascari and Sbordone (2014) the slope of the Phillips curve
is a function of the steady-state inflation and when this is not zero then the Phillips curve be-
comes flatter. This reflects that agents become more forward looking since expected inflation
is going to erode their average markup (King and Wolman (1999)). However, as the Phillips
curve becomes flatter the ability of the monetary authorities to bring inflation back to its target
diminishes and long term rates need to stay low for longer (relative to the zero steady-state
inflation case) for this to occur. This stimulates demand from the fifth quarter onwards miti-
gating the output risks caused by the adverse monetary policy shock. In other words, a small
positive steady-state inflation seems to have beneficial effects on the output volatility when au-
thorities set policies based on a Taylor type objective function. King and Wolman (1996) and
King and Wolman (1999) (amongst others) have already shown that a small positive inflation
can increase welfare by acting as tax on firms average markup. Here we illustrate that a small
positive steady-state inflation can have a beneficial impact vis-a`-vis output volatility.
Due to the linearity of the Taylor rule the volatility of the policy rate simply reflects the inflation
and the output growth volatility. However, the volatility of the long-term interest rate seems
to be associated with the inflation and not the output volatility (see Figures 3 - 6), which
is again consistent with the work of Piazzesi and Schneider (2007), Rudebusch and Swanson
(2012) and Swanson (2015) (amongst others). In this model there is no default or/and liquidity
type frictions and it is only the inflation that can erode the capital gains from investing on
long-term debt and this is why volatility about the long-term interest rates reflects (mainly)
concerns about the inflation.
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4 Conclusion
This study investigates the response of macroeconomic volatility to an unexpected increase in
the policy rate. For this purpose we use a simple New Keynesian model, with firm specific
capital, non-zero steady-state inflation, long-run risks and Epstein-Zin preferences. The model
is calibrated to match a set of macroeconomic and financial moments using US data. Simula-
tions from the theoretical model reveal that a monetary policy shock that increases the policy
rate by 150 basis points causes output and inflation volatility to rise by around 10% above its
unconditional value. This result matches empirical evidence based on a SVAR with stochastic
volatility. The slope of the Phillips curve, which also depends on the size of the steady state
inflation, induces a trade off between real and nominal uncertainty. Non zero steady-state
inflation makes the agents in the model to be more forward looking and decreases the effec-
tiveness of policy actions to restore inflation back to its target. This induces authorities to
keep rates low for longer, which pushes output above its steady-state after the first year. This
elevated demand required to bring inflation back to its target, mitigates the real uncertainty
effects of a monetary policy shock. When there is no trend inflation the Phillips curve is sig-
nificantly steeper and a monetary policy shock increases real uncertainty by more than 30%,
while nominal uncertainty decreases by more than 10%.
In future work it would be interesting to explore if this relationship between the policy shock
and macroeconomic volatility extends to industrialised countries other than the United States
and if there is any significant cross-country variation. It may also be instructive to examine if
the impact of monetary policy shock on second moments has changed over time.
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h˜t = α + θh˜t−1 +
K∑
j=1
djZt−j + ηt, ηt ∼ N(0, Q), E (et, ηt) = 0 (33)







A.1 Prior distributions and starting values
A.1.1 VAR coefficients
Following Banbura et al. (2007), we employ a Normal prior implemented via dummy obser-


















where γ1 to γn denote the prior mean for the parameters on the first lag obtained by estimating
individual AR(1) regressions, τ measures the tightness of the prior on the VAR coefficients,
and c is the tightness of the prior on the constant term. We set τ = 0.1. and c = 1/1000.
Note that these dummies do not directly implement a prior belief on the VAR error covariance
matrix which is time-varying in our setting.
The priors for the coefficients are thus: N (Γ0, P0) where Γ0 = (x
′
DxD)
−1 (x′DyD) and P0 =
S ⊗ (x′DxD)−1 where S is a diagonal matrix with an estimate of the variance of Zt (obtained
using the training sample described below) on the main diagonal.
A.1.2 Elements of Ht
Following Cogley and Sargent (2005b) we use a training sample (of 120 pre-sample observations
from 1947M1 to 1957M12 ) to set the prior for the elements of the transition equation of the
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model. Let vˆols denote the OLS estimate of the VAR covariance matrix estimated on the
pre-sample data. The prior for h˜t at t = 0 is defined as lnh0 ∼ N(lnµ0, I4) where µ0 are the
diagonal elements of the Cholesky decomposition of vˆols.
A.1.3 Elements of A






where aˆols are the off-





is assumed to be diagonal with the elements set equal to 100. We employ a tighter
prior for elements where sign restrictions are imposed.
A.1.4 Parameters of the transition equation
The prior on the coefficients and error covariance of the transition equation 33 is implemented
via dummy variables (see Banbura et al. (2007)), shrinking each equation towards an AR
process. This set of artificial data also includes dummy variables to implement the inverse
Wishart prior on Q and the coefficients on the predetermined regressors. The prior tightness
parameter controlling the strength of the prior on the coefficients on the lagged volatilities is
set equal to 0.05. The parameter that controls the prior tightness on the lagged pre-determined
variables is also set to 0.05.
A.2 Simulating the posterior distributions
A.2.1 VAR coefficients
The distribution of the VAR coefficients Γ conditional on all other parameters Ξ and the













. Following Carter and Kohn (2004) we use the
Kalman filter to estimate ΓT\T and PT\T where we account for the fact that the covariance
matrix of the VAR residuals changes through time. Note that since we condition on h˜t and
A, the form of the heteroscedasticity is known. To use the Kalman filter we write the VAR in
state space form as







The Kalman filter is initialised at Γ0 and P0 and the recursions are given by the following




ηt\t−1 = yt − xtΓt\t−1








Γt\t = Γt\t−1 +Ktηt\t−1
Pt\t = Pt\t−1 −KtxtPt\t−1
The final iteration of the Kalman filter at time T delivers ΓT\T and PT\T . This application of
the Carter and Kohn (2004) algorithm to this heteroscedastic VAR model is equivalent to a
GLS transformation of the model.
A.2.2 Element of At





= et where Z˜t =
Zt−c+
∑P
j=1 βjZit−j = vt and V AR (et) = Ht. This is a system of linear equations with a known
form of heteroscedasticity. The conditional distributions for a linear regression apply to each
equation of this system after a simple GLS transformation to make the errors homoscedastic.
The ith equation of this system is given as vit = −αv−it + eit where the subscript i denotes the
ith column while −i denotes columns 1 to i − 1. Note that the variance of eit is time-varying











to produce v∗it = −αv∗−it + e∗it where * denotes the transformed variables and
var (e∗it) = 1. The conditional posterior for α is normal with mean and variance given by M
∗





























A.2.3 Elements of Ht
Conditional on the VAR coefficients and the parameters of the transition equation, the model
has a multivariate non-linear state-space representation. Note that, the presence of lagged
pre-determined variables in the transition equation 33, the constant term is time-varying.
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Carlin et al. (1992) show that the conditional distribution of the state variables in a general














where Ξ denotes all other parameters. In the context of stochastic volatility models, Jacquier
et al. (1994) show that this density is a product of log normal densities for h¯t and h¯t+1 and a




.Carlin et al. (1992) derive the general form of the


















∼ N (B2tb2t, B2t) (36)
where B−12t = Q
−1+F ′Q−1F and b2t = h˜t−1F ′Q−1+h˜t+1Q−1F. Note that due to the non-linearity
of the observation equation of the model an analytical expression for the complete conditional
h˜t\Zt,Ξ is unavailable and a metropolis step is required. Following Jacquier et al. (1994) we
draw from 35 using a date-by-date independence metropolis step using the density in 36 as the
candidate generating density. This choice implies that the acceptance probability is given by




at the old and the new draw. To implement
the algorithm we begin with an initial estimate of h˜ defined as (∆Zt)
2 + 0.00001 where the
offset constant 0.00001 is added to ensure positive volatility. We set the matrix h˜old equal to
the initial volatility estimate. Then at each date the following two steps are implemented:





−1F and B−12t = Q
−1 + F ′Q−1F
2. Update h˜oldt = h˜
new























and Ωt = A
−1HtA−1
′
Repeating these steps for the entire time series delivers a draw of the stochastic volatilties.7
A.2.4 Parameters of the transition equation
Conditional on the draw for the volatilities, the conditional posterior for B¯ = vec ([α, θ, d1, ..dj])
the parameters of the VAR in equation 32 is Normal. Letting y and x denote the left and the
right hand side of the VAR in 32, the conditional posterior of the coefficients is defined as
G
(
B¯\Ξ) ˜N(B∗, Q⊗ (x∗′x∗)−1)
7In order to take endpoints into account, the algorithm is modified slightly for the initial condition and the
last observation. Details of these changes can be found in Jacquier et al. (1994).
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where B∗ = (x∗′x∗)−1 (x∗′y∗) and x∗ and y∗ denote x and y appended with dummy observations.
The conditional posterior for Q is inverse Wishart and is given by
G (Q\Ξ) ˜IW (S∗, T ∗)
where T ∗ denote the number of actual observations plus the number of dummy observations
and S∗ = (y∗ − x∗b∗)′ (y∗ − x∗b∗)
The MCMC algorithm is applied using 100,000 iterations discarding the first 95,000 as burn-in.





















































where eit, vit˜N(0, 1) for i = 1, 2. We generate 500 observations and discard the first 100 to
remove the effect of initial conditions. The experiment is repeated 100 times. At each iteration
we calculate the impulse response to the two level shocks using an MCMC run of 5000 iterations.
A comparison of the true and estimated responses in figure 7 shows that the true response
lies within the 95th percentile obtained from the simulation. This shows that the algorithm
provides a satisfactory performance.
B Sensitivity Analysis
Figure 8 presents the impulse responses from an extended model that allows feedback from the










The policy shock is identified using the benchmark sign restrictions discussed in the main text.
The results in figure 8 show that this extension does not have a big impact on the results–The
monetary policy shock leads to an increase in the volatility of the endogenous variables.
Figure 9 shows that when the lag length K in transition equation 33 is increased to 12, the
key results remain similar to the benchmark case. Finally in figure 10 we present results from
a version of the model that replaces industrial production growth with the the unemployment
























































































































































































































































































































































raises rates also leads to a rise in unemployment rate and a decrease in inflation on impact. The
policy shock leads to an increase in the volatility of the endogenous variables, with the variance
of the interest rates rising by a larger amount than inflation and unemployment variance. Figure
11 shows that the main results are preserved when the (de-trended) stock index is added to the
model in place of the term spread
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C DSGE Model Analysis
C.1 Stationary Equations
u (Ct, Lt) =
C1−σCt

























































































From the stoschastic discount factor we obtain
M = Γ−σC













































Then from the price dispersion equation
∆ =
(










C = (1− g)Y d (56)
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From the demand for labour
W =
MC (1− φ)Y d
L
(57)
From the labour supply
χ0 =
W
LσLCσC
(58)
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